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Hopes for a diplomatic solution to the political crisis in Haiti have once again been dashed following
the failure of the latest negotiation initiative by Dante Caputo special envoy for the United Nations
and Organization of American States (OAS). Despite initially encouraging signs, at the eleventh
hour the military and Haiti's de facto government refused to agree to a UN-OAS proposal presented
by Caputo during his most recent trip to Haiti April 14-16, marking the third time that diplomatic
efforts to resolve the 19-month long crisis have collapsed in the final stages. In this latest diplomatic
effort which also involved Spanish diplomat Francesc Vendrell and US special envoy to Haiti
Lawrence Pezzulo Caputo held discussions with representatives of key sectors of Haitian society,
including the military, government authorities, legislative representatives, and the business
community. According to UN Secretary General Butros Butros Ghali, the three main objectives
of the negotiations were president Jean Bertrand Aristide's return to power, the formation of a
"national consensus" government, and amnesty for all those involved in the coup. In addition, the
new proposal called for an increase in the number of UN and OAS human rights observers in the
country from the current 150 to 500 in order to avoid retaliatory acts against coup leaders or their
supporters. In the most recent round of discussions, negotiators focused specifically on the selection
of a new prime minister. The prime minister would be responsible for appointing a government
to guide the transition to constitutional rule, which would, over the course of six months, pave the
way for Aristide's resumption of presidential powers. During the transition period, armed forces
leader Brig. Gen. Raoul Cedras would have to resign, along with other top army officers involved
in the September 1991 coup. In return, Aristide had agreed to grant the coup leaders an amnesty
for political crimes, although not common crimes. In addition, he had pledged not to initiate any
criminal proceedings, nor to oppose efforts by the legislature to grant a "blanket amnesty" to
outgoing military leaders. The accord also called for the gradual lifting of the OAS- imposed trade
embargo. In fact, international organizations and the US government had pledged wide support for
economic recovery once the democratic government was restored. US officials had even suggested
the possibility of sending US troops to assist in reconstruction efforts, and to help restructure the
Haitian armed forces. To pressure the military and de facto government to accept the proposal,
diplomats involved in the negotiations had warned that a rejection of the plan could result in stiff
new sanctions against Haiti, plus the withdrawal of the amnesty offer. "We don't think it is really a
question of whether, but when, they will accept," an unnamed foreign official in Port-au- Prince told
the New York Times. "The High Command must realize by now that this is the best deal that they
are going to get." Nevertheless, signs that the agreement was in trouble began to surface publicly
April 13 when de facto prime minister Marc Bazin delivered a nationally-broadcast address calling
for a "Haitian solution" to the crisis. He called on the country to "tighten our ranks and speak with
a single voice," rejecting what he condemned as foreign-imposed solutions. In fact, not all observers
were surprised by the frustrated end to the negotiations. For example, one former Haitian official
cited by the New York Times prior to the break down of negotiations had already predicted that the
military would call the international community's bluff. "They have been saying `do this or else' for
18 months. The military will wait and see what the `or else' is." Following Caputo's departure from
Port-au-Prince April 16 with news of the failure of negotiations, the US government began openly
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warning the de facto authorities that a series of targeted punitive measures are being prepared
and will soon be implemented if the stalling continues. Although Washington has not publicly
specified the measures being considered, diplomats and anonymous administration officials said
the sanctions would include the cancellation of US visas for coup supporters and their families,
the freezing of financial assets in US banks, and the interruption of commercial air traffic. If these
measures fail to move the Haitians toward a compromise solution, stronger sanctions could be
imposed, including cutting off oil supplies to the island and blocking Haiti's cross-border trade with
the Dominican Republic. US Secretary of State Warren Christopher said the administration hoped
that, given a short period of reflection, the Haitian military will reverse its decision. Meanwhile,
acting US ambassador to the UN Edward Walker said, "To the Haitian parties, we say, you must
negotiate seriously, with promptness and flexibility. To the Haitian people, we say, the world has not
forgotten you." (Sources: United Press International, 04/13/93; Inter Press Service, 03/29/93, 04/02/93,
04/14/93, 04/16/93; Associated Press, 04/12-16/93, 04/19/93, 04/20/93; Agence France-Presse, 03/24/93,
03/27-30/93, 04/03/93, 04/17/93, 04/19-21/93; Spanish news service EFE, 04/03/93, 04/11/93, 04/13/93,
04/17/93, 04/21/93; New York Times, 03/16/93, 03/17/93, 03/30-04/02/93, 04/14/93, 04/15/93, 04/18/93,
04/21/93)
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